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* I would like to thank Paul Schwartz for his comments on this chapter and
John Spaccarotella for his research assistance. More extensive information
about the topics discussed in this article can be found in DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRI-
VACY LAW (2d ed. 2006). 
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§ 1:1 Introduction
In recent years, information privacy has emerged as one of the
central issues of our times. Today, we have hundreds of laws per-
taining to privacy: the common law torts, criminal law, evidentiary
privileges, constitutional law, at least twenty federal statutes, and
numerous statutes in each of the fifty states. To understand the law
of information privacy more completely, it is necessary to look to its
origins and growth. Technology has played a large role in the story
of the emergence of information privacy law. Frequently, new laws
emerge in response to changes in technology that have increased the
collection, dissemination, and use of personal information.
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§ 1:2 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
§ 1:2 Colonial America
To the colonists, America afforded unprecedented privacy. As
David Flaherty notes, “[s]olitude was readily available in colonial
America.”1 From the crowded towns and cities of Europe, America’s
endless expanse provided significantly more space and distance
from other people.2 But many people still lived in small towns,
where everybody knew each other ’s business. As Flaherty observes:
“The population in the early years was still so small that no person
could escape the physical surveillance of others without special ef-
forts.”3 
Even in the early days of colonial America, there was some limit-
ed legal protection of privacy. The law had long protected against
eavesdropping, which William Blackstone defined as “listen[ing] un-
der walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after dis-
course, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.”4
The common law also sanctioned being a common scold, a law that
applied only to women.5 
The law had long protected one’s home. The maxim that the
home is one’s castle appeared as early as 1499.6 Better-known is a
judicial pronouncement in Semayne’s Case7 in 1604 that “the
house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress.”8 According
to William Blackstone, the law has “so particular and tender a re-
gard to the immunity of a man’s house that it stiles it his castle,
and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.”9 
At the time of the Revolutionary War, the central privacy issue
was freedom from government intrusion. The Founders detested
the use of general warrants and writs of assistance.10 Writs of assis-
tance authorized “sweeping searches and seizures without any evi-
dentiary basis”11 and general warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and
1. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1 (1972).
2. Id. at 33.
3. Id. at 2.
4. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 168
(1769).
5. See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6–7
(1978).
6. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1892, 1894 n.18 (1981).
7. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
8. Id. at 195.
9. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 223.
10. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994); see also LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999).
11. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment
as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1998).
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seizure of the personal papers of political dissenters, authors, and
printers of seditious libel.”12 As Patrick Henry declared: “They may,
unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or
some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms, and
search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and wear.
They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.”13 
The framers’ distaste for excessive government power to invade
the privacy of the people was forged into the Bill of Rights in the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Third Amendment pro-
tects the privacy of the home by preventing the government from re-
quiring soldiers to reside in people’s houses: “No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.”14 
The Fourth Amendment provides broad limitations on the gov-
ernment’s power to search and to seize:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.15 
The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from conduct-
ing “unreasonable searches and seizures.”16 Government officials
must obtain judicial approval before conducting a search through a
warrant supported by probable cause.
The Fifth Amendment affords individuals a privilege against be-
ing compelled to testify about incriminating information.17 In other
words, the government cannot compel individuals to divulge incul-
patory information about themselves.
12. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also
William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 406 (1995).
13. THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 448–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1974).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. Id.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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§ 1:3 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
§ 1:3 The Nineteenth Century
§ 1:3.1 New Threats to Privacy
The nineteenth century experienced a series of new threats to
privacy and a growing concern about protecting privacy.
[A] The Census and Government Records
For much of the nineteenth century, state and federal govern-
ments did not keep extensive information about citizens.18 During
the late nineteenth century, government record-keeping at the state
and local level began to increase with the rise of progressive regula-
tion.19 
The primary form of information gathering by the federal gov-
ernment was the census. The first census in 1790 asked only four
questions.20 The number of questions increased with each census,
growing to 142 questions in 1860.21 These questions were increas-
ingly delving into personal details. To make matters worse, since
1790, copies of the census were posted in public places so people
could check errors.22 This practice stopped in 1870.23 
When the 1890 census asked about diseases, disabilities, and fi-
nances, it created a public outcry, which ultimately lead to the pas-
sage in the early twentieth century of stricter laws protecting the
confidentiality of census data.24 For example, in 1919, Congress
made it a felony to publicize census information illegally.25 
[B] The Mail
Since colonial times, the privacy of the mail was a significant
problem. Sealing letters was difficult.26 Benjamin Franklin, who was
in charge of the colonial mails, required his employees to swear an
oath not to open mail.27 And in 1782, Congress passed a law that
mail should not be opened.28 
18. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000).
19. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1892, 1906-07 (1981).
20. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1995).
21. See id. 
22. See SEIPP, supra note 5, at19.
23. See id.
24. See REGAN, supra note 20, at 47.
25. See id.
26. SMITH, supra note 18, at 23–25. 
27. Id. at 49; REGAN, supra note 20, at 46–49.
28. SMITH, supra note 18 at 50.
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Nevertheless, significant concerns persisted about postal clerks
reading people’s letters. Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton,
and George Washington frequently complained about the lack of
privacy in their letters, and they would sometimes write in code.29
As Thomas Jefferson wrote: “[T]he infidelities of the post office and
the circumstances of the times are against my writing fully and free-
ly.”30 
These problems persisted in the nineteenth century, and the law
responded. Congress passed several laws protecting the privacy of
the mail.31 In 1825, Congress enacted a statute that provided:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post
office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any
letter or mail carrier, . . . before it has been delivered to the per-
son to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the corre-
spondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or
opens, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned.32 
In 1877, in Ex parte Jackson,33 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited government officials from opening
letters without a warrant: “The constitutional guaranty of the right
of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be.”34 
[C] Telegraph Communications
The burgeoning use of the telegraph raised a number of privacy
problems. Shortly after the telegraph’s invention in 1844,35 technol-
ogy to tap into telegraph communications emerged. As Priscilla
Regan observes:
29. Id. at 50–51; see also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW
ENGLAND 115-27 (1972).
30. Thomas Jefferson in 1798, quoted in SEIPP, supra note 5, at 1.
31. Id. at 50–51.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1702. This law is still valid today. See SMITH, supra note 18,
at 51.
33. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
34. Id. at 733.
35. See SMITH, supra note 18 at 123.
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§ 1:3.1 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
During the Civil War, the Union and Confederate armies tapped
each other's telegraph communications to ascertain battle plans
and troop movements. Rival press organizations tapped each
other's wire communications in order to be the first to report
major news items.36 
After the Civil War, Congress began to seek access to telegraph
messages maintained by Western Union for various investiga-
tions.37 This raised a considerable outcry among some members of
Congress.38 Additionally, a New York Times editorial decried the
practice as “an outrage upon the liberties of the citizen.”39 Another
editorial in the New York Tribune complained that the seizure of
telegrams “violates the commonest legal maxims as to the right to
call for papers, and outrages every man’s sense of his right to the se-
crets of his own correspondence.”40 A New York Sun editorial stated
that “the idea that every curious and prying legislative committee
may cause to be spread before the public everything that has been
sent over the wires will be hateful and repulsive to the people in
general.”41 
These problems resulted in a growing congressional debate about
whether telegrams should be accorded similar privacy protections to
letters.42 A bill to protect the privacy of telegrams was introduced
into Congress in 1880.43 The bill would ultimately be abandoned.
But beyond congressional attempts to obtain telegraph communica-
tions, the law responded to restrict other entities from breaching
the privacy of telegrams. Several courts quashed subpoenas for tele-
grams, analogizing them to letters.44 As the Missouri Supreme
Court stated in quashing a grand jury subpoena for telegrams:
“Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy the usefulness of
this most important and valuable mode of communication.”45 State
legislatures also responded by passing laws to prohibit the disclo-
sure of telegraph messages by telegraph company employees.46 More
than half the states enacted laws.47 
36. REGAN, supra note 20, at 111.
37. See SMITH, supra note 18 at 69; SEIPP, supra note 5, at 30.
38. See SEIPP, supra note 5, at 31.
39. Id. at 31. 
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 36. 
42. SMITH, supra note 18, at 69.
43. SEIPP, supra note 5, at 40.
44. Id.
45. Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880). 
46. SEIPP, supra note 5, at 65.
47. Id. 
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§ 1:3.2 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
Ex parte Jackson was not the only major development in Fourth
Amendment law in the nineteenth century. In 1886, the Court de-
cided the landmark case of Boyd v. United States.48 The government
wanted to compel a merchant to produce documents in a civil for-
feiture proceeding. The Court, however, held that the documents
could not be compelled, basing its conclusion on both the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal
liberty and private property. . . . [A]ny forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment run almost into each other.
Boyd and subsequent cases created a powerful protection of one’s
papers and personal information. In the twentieth century, this pro-
tection increasingly interfered with the growing administrative
state. As William Stuntz notes, “[g]overnment regulation required
lots of information, and Boyd came dangerously close to giving reg-
ulated actors a blanket entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to
see how modern health, safety, environmental, or economic regula-
tion would be possible in such a regime.”49 As a result, the Court
began to retreat from Boyd throughout the twentieth century.50 
§ 1:3.3 Privacy of the Body
Another important Supreme Court privacy case of the 19th cen-
tury established protection against physical bodily intrusions. In
1891, the Court held in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,51
that a court could not compel a female plaintiff in a civil action to
submit to a surgical examination:
48. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
49. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1050 (1995). 
50. See section 1:4.2[E], infra.
51. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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§ 1:3.4 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compul-
sory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one,
and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to
the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity,
an assault, and a trespass. . . .52 
This case is one of the earliest recognitions of what would later
come to be called “substantive due process privacy.”
The sanctity of the body was also recognized in the common law,
even prior to the birth of the privacy torts following Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis’s article. In De May v. Roberts,53 an 1881 case, a
physician allowed a “young unmarried man” not schooled in medi-
cine to be present while the plaintiff gave birth. The court reasoned:
It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propriety
to doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford an
ample remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred
one and no one had a right to intrude unless invited or because
of some real and pressing necessity.54 
§ 1:3.4 Warren and Brandeis’s the Right to Privacy
The most profound development in privacy law was the publica-
tion in 1890 of Warren and Brandeis’s article “The Right to Priva-
cy.”55 According to Roscoe Pound, the article did “nothing less than
add a chapter to our law.”56 And Harry Kalven, Jr. referred to it as
the “most influential law review article of all.”57 
The article was inspired, in part, by a vastly expanding form of
media—the newspaper. In the second latter half of the nineteenth
century, newspapers were the most rapidly growing type of media.
Circulation of newspapers rose about 1,000% from 1850 and 1890,
from 100 newspapers with 800,000 readers in 1850 to 900 papers
with over 8 million readers by 1890. Increasingly, newspapers re-
ported on sensationalistic topics such as scandals and gossip about
52. Id. at 252.
53. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
54. Id. at 148–49.
55. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
56. ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946).
57. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
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people’s lives, a type of journalism that became known as “yellow
journalism.”58 As Warren and Brandeis observed: “The press is over-
stepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and de-
cency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery.”59 
Warren and Brandeis were also concerned about a new technolo-
gy: “instantaneous photograph[y.]”60 Cameras had been large, ex-
pensive, and not very portable. In 1884, the Eastman Kodak
Company produced the “snap camera,” a hand-held camera for gen-
eral public use. People could now take candid pictures in public
places.61 Warren and Brandeis anticipated a dangerous mix between
this new technology and the sensationalistic press: “Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred pre-
cincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devic-
es threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”62 
These new threats required a remedy. The difficulty was that the
existing common law did not currently afford much of a legal pro-
tection of privacy. Defamation law—the torts of libel and slander—
protected against false information, not true private information.
Contract law could protect privacy within relationships formed be-
tween parties, but it could not protect against privacy invasions by
third parties outside of the contract. Warren and Brandeis observed: 
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such
that one’s picture could seldom be taken without his con-
sciously “sitting” for the purpose, the law of contract or of trust
might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards against the
improper circulation of his portrait; but since the latest
advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to take
pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust
are inadequate to support the required protection.63 
58. William L. Prosser, Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:
AN ANTHOLOGY 104 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (noting rising
popular dismay over “yellow journalism” at the time of Brandeis’s and
Warren’s article).
59. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
60. Id. at 195.
61. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFOR-
MATION PRIVACY LAW 10 (2d ed. 2006).
62. Id.
63. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 211. 
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Property law was also inadequate to protect privacy. As Warren
and Brandeis observed: “[W]here the value of the production is
found not in the right to take profits arising from publication, but in
the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any
publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of proper-
ty.”64 
Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law could readily
develop a remedy for protecting privacy. The authors noted: “The
common law secures to each individual the right of determining, or-
dinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others.”65 These rights were not based
upon property. Rather, they were based upon “the more general right
of the individual to be let alone.”66 From this more general right,
protections against privacy violations could be derived in the com-
mon law.67 Warren and Brandeis discussed a number of remedies to
protect privacy, with the principal remedy being “[a]n action of tort
for damages in all cases.”68 
§ 1:4 The Twentieth Century
§ 1:4.1 1900 to 1960
[A] Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Torts
[A][1] Early Recognition
In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals confronted the issue in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.69 An advertisement by Fran-
klin Mills Flour used a lithograph of Abigail Roberson without her
consent. Roberson sued, alleging that she had been “greatly humili-
ated by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have recognized her face
and picture on this advertisement, and her good name has been at-
tacked, causing her great distress and suffering, both in body and
mind.”70 The court, however, refused to recognize a cause of action
because there was “no precedent for such an action to be found in
the decisions of this court” and the creation of such an action would
more appropriately be achieved by the legislature because the courts
were “without authority to legislate.”71 
64. Id. at 200. 
65. Id. at 198. 
66. Id. at 205. 
67. See id. at 205.
68. Id. at 219. 
69. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
70. Id. at 442.
71. Id. at 447–48.
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The Roberson decision sparked a significant debate. A New York
Times editorial criticized the decision, observing that it “excited as
much amazement among lawyers and jurists as among the promis-
cuous lay public.”72 A note in the Yale Law Journal attacked the de-
cision for not recognizing a remedy for the “undoubted injury to the
plaintiff.”73 Another law review article declared that Roberson
“shocks and wounds the ordinary sense of justice of mankind.”74 As
a result of this wave of criticism, one of the judges in Roberson de-
fended the opinion in the Columbia Law Review.75 
In 1903, just one year after the decision, New York enacted a
statute establishing a cause of action for invasion of privacy.76 The
law still remains on the books today.77 
A couple of years later, in 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court rec-
ognized a common law tort for privacy invasions in Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co.78 In facts similar to Roberson, a life in-
surance advertisement used the plaintiff ’s image without his con-
sent. The court concluded that a “right of privacy in matters purely
private is . . . derived from natural law.”79 As the court reasoned:
One who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right to
choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he
will submit himself to the public gaze. Subject to the limitation
above referred to, the body of a person cannot be put on exhibi-
tion at any time or at any place without his consent. . . . It
therefore follows from what has been said that a violation of the
right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individ-
ual.80 
72. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, Editorial, reprinted in Denis O’Brien, The
Right to Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437 (1902).
73. Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?, 12 YALE L.J. 34, 36 (1902).
74. 36 AM. L. REV. 636, quoted in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905).
75. Denis O’Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1902). 
76. See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since War-
ren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990).
77. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51. 
78. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
79. Id. at 70.
80. Id.
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§ 1:4.1 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
[A][2] William Prosser and the Restatement
In 1960, renowned tort scholar William Prosser surveyed the
over 300 privacy cases that were spawned by the Warren and Bran-
deis article.81 Prosser concluded that the cases recognized four dis-
tinct torts: 
(1) intrusion upon seclusion;
(2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) false light or “publicity”; and
(4) appropriation.82 
Today, the vast majority of states recognize most of these torts.83
The most recent state to do so was Minnesota in Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,84 where the state Supreme Court finally recognized the
Warren and Brandeis torts in 1998.85 
[A][2][a] Intrusion upon Seclusion 
As defined by the Restatement of Torts, intrusion upon seclusion
provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
vacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.86 
Intrusion upon seclusion protects against electronic eavesdrop-
ping into conversations in the home,87 as well as the deceitful entry
and clandestine photographing of activities in the home. The tort is
not limited to intrusions into the home.88 In a case involving well-
known consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the court held that an at-
tempt by General Motors to hire people to “shadow” him and “keep
him under surveillance” could be tortious if the surveillance was
“overzealous.”89 
81. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
82. Id.
83. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). 
84. Id.
85. Id. at 235.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
87. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
88. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). 
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[A][2][b] Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
The tort of public disclosure of private facts provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legiti-
mate concern to the public.90 
In an early case, Melvin v. Reid,91 the court held that the use of
an ex-prostitute’s maiden name in the movie “The Red Kimono”
could give rise to a public disclosure action. Courts have sustained
public disclosure suits for publishing a photograph of a woman
whose dress was blown up involuntarily by air jets;92 for the publi-
cation of an article describing a person’s unusual disease;93 and for
posting a large sign in a window stating that the plaintiff owed a
debt.94 
The Supreme Court has curtailed the scope of the public disclo-
sure tort. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,95 the Court held that “[o]nce
true information is disclosed in public court documents open to
public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing
it.”96 In Smith v. Daily Mail,97 the Court held unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting the publication of the names of juvenile offend-
ers: “If a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitu-
tionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to fur-
ther a state interest of the highest order.”98 And in Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,99 the Court held that a newspaper could not be liable for pub-
lishing the name of a rape victim obtained from a police report.100
These decisions notwithstanding, the Court has repeatedly avoided
addressing the constitutionality of the public disclosure tort, and it
has confined its holdings to relatively narrow contexts.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
91. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931).
92. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
93. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). 
94. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927). 
95. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
96. Id. at 496.
97. Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
98. Id. at 103.
99. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
100. Id. at 532.
WHOLEBOOK.book  Page 15  Monday, October 16, 2006  3:50 PM
1–16
§ 1:4.1 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
[A][2][c] False Light
The tort of false light is defined as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to lia-
bility to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disre-
gard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed.101 
[A][2][d] Appropriation
Pursuant to the Restatement:
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy.102 
In the mid twentieth century, an offshoot of the appropriation
tort emerged, referred to as the “right of publicity.”103 The right of
publicity originated in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,104 where the court declared that “in addition to and indepen-
dent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privi-
lege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made ‘in gross,’ that is, without an accompanying transfer of a busi-
ness or of anything else.”105 According to Thomas McCarthy, “while
the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an in-
jury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to
the pocket book.”106 
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
102. Id. § 652C.
103. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (2000);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954).
104. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
105. Id. at 868.
106. MCCARTHY, supra note 103, § 5:61, at 5-110.
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The emergence of the right of publicity is often viewed as dis-
tinct from appropriation, but is sometimes viewed as merely a
dimension of the appropriation tort. William Prosser did not recog-
nize a distinct tort of publicity, and neither did the Restatement.107 
[B] The Emergence of the Breach of 
Confidentiality Tort
Beyond the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, the tort of breach
of confidentiality developed to protect disclosures of information in
violation of trust within certain relationships. For example, in
1920, in Simonsen v. Swenson,108 the court recognized that
[t]he relation of physician and patient is necessarily a highly
confidential one. It is often necessary for the patient to give
information about himself which would be most embarrassing
or harmful to him if given general circulation. This information
the physician is bound, not only upon his own professional
honor and the ethics of his high profession, to keep secret. . . . A
wrongful breach of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust,
would give rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flow-
ing from such wrong.109 
The Simonsen court concluded that the breach of confidentiality
tort is not absolute, and it does not apply when disclosure is man-
dated by statute or when disclosure will protect the health and safe-
ty of others. As one court has stated: “A majority of the jurisdictions
faced with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a phy-
sician for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information
unless the disclosure is compelled by law or is in the patient’s inter-
est or the public interest.”110 
Some courts have held that because the breach of confidentiality
tort emerges from the patient-physician relationship, analogous to a
fiduciary one, the tort extends to a third party who “induces a
breach of a trustee’s duty of loyalty, or participates in such a breach,
or knowingly accepts any benefit from such a breach, becomes di-
rectly liable to the aggrieved party.”111 
107. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 189–91.
108. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920).
109. Id. at 832.
110. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); see also Bid-
dle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999).
111. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (D. Ohio 1965).
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[C] The Growth of Government Record Systems
The rise of the administrative state in the first half of the twenti-
eth century resulted in the creation of elaborate systems of public
records.112 For example, the Social Security System, created in 1935,
required that records be maintained about each employed individu-
al’s earnings. To administer the program efficiently, a unique nine-
digit number was assigned to each citizen, known as the Social
Security number (SSN). The number was only to be used for the
Social Security system, and it was not designed as a general identifi-
er, with social security cards stating that SSNs were “NOT FOR
IDENTIFICATION.”113 As will be discussed later, this number soon
was used for a myriad of other purposes.
[D] The Telephone and Wiretapping
[D][1] The Fourth Amendment: Olmstead v. United 
States 
The early twentieth century witnessed the growth of telephone
communication. Shortly after the telephone was patented in 1876,
methods of intercepting communications through wiretapping were
developed.114 As with telegraph communications, there was a grow-
ing concern about the privacy of telephone communications. State
legislatures responded with new legislation. For example, in 1905,
California expanded its 1862 law against intercepting telegraph
messages to telephone calls.115 
In 1928, the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States116 con-
fronted the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment required a war-
rant before the government could engage in wiretapping. The Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to wiretapping
because it did not involve trespass inside a person’s home: “There
was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry
of the houses or offices of the defendants.”117 
112. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE
73 (2001).
113. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 288 (2000).
114. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VAL-
UES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1995).
115. SMITH, supra note 113, at 157.
116. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
117. Id. at 464.
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Justice Louis Brandeis dissented. Although he did not cite to his
article “The Right to Privacy,” his dissent reflects many of its cen-
tral ideas. Brandeis argued that new technological developments ne-
cessitated revising traditional views of the Fourth Amendment in
order to preserve its purpose of protecting privacy:
Subtler and more far reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet.118 
[D][2] Federal Communications Act Section 605
Despite the Court’s opinion in Olmstead, wiretapping continued
to be viewed with considerable distaste. Justice Holmes called it a
“dirty business.”119 One year after Olmstead, J. Edgar Hoover, the
head of the FBI, stated that “while it may not be illegal . . . [wiretap-
ping] is unethical and it is not permitted under the regulations by
the Attorney General.”120 Hoover declared that any FBI employee
engaging in wiretapping would be fired.121 Ironically, Hoover went
on to become one of the greatest abusers of wiretapping.
Six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.122 Section 605 provided: “no
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
s tance ,  purpor t ,  e f f ec t ,  o r  meaning  o f  such intercepted
communications to any person.”123 The statute only applied to fed-
eral, not state, officials. According to the Supreme Court, section
605 prohibited evidence obtained by wiretapping from being used in
court.124 But the statute did not restrict officials from engaging in
wiretapping, only from disclosing intercepted communications in
118. Id. at 473.
119. Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY
IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 49 (1987).
120. Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107,
127 (1986).
121. Id.
122. Former 7 U.S.C. § 605.
123. Id.
124. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence directly
obtained by wiretapping excluded from evidence); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (evidence obtained as the fruit of illegal wire-
tapping could not be used in court).
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court proceedings.125 As a result, wiretapping by the FBI and state
law enforcement officials increased dramatically throughout the
twentieth century.126 
[E] The FBI and Increasing Domestic 
Surveillance
The FBI was originally formed in 1908 amid substantial opposi-
tion in Congress to a federal police force.127 Indeed, Congress never
directly authorized the creation of the FBI by legislation. At first,
the FBI was known as the Bureau of Investigation (BI); it became
the FBI in 1935.128 Throughout the twentieth century, the FBI ex-
panded in size and in the scope of its surveillance activities.
During World War II, the FBI received a profoundly expanded au-
thority to engage in wiretapping and investigate national security
threats. The FBI seized upon fears of Communism during the
1950s to increase its ability to engage in electronic surveillance.129
Hoover greatly abused his powers as head of the FBI. He wiretapped
his critics and people whose views he disliked, and he maintained
an elaborate system of files about the personal lives of hundreds of
prominent individuals, politicians, professors, and others. Hoover
despised Martin Luther King, Jr., and he engaged in a systematic
surveillance of him, including wiretapping and bugging his conver-
sations.130 When the FBI learned of King’s extramarital affairs, a
high level official sent King a letter suggesting that King commit
suicide or else the recordings of his conversations would be “bared
to the nation.”131 
Hoover ’s abuses came to light a few years after his death, when
in 1975, Congress’s Church Committee conducted an extensive in-
quiry into Hoover ’s activities.132 
125. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000).
126. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1128–33 (2002).
127. CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 112
(1991).
128. See id. at 113.
129. See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POL-
ITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 161–62 (1998).
130. See id. at 140–42.
131. Id. at 126.
132. See id. at 178.
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[F] Freedom of Association and the McCarthy 
Era
The Civil Rights era led to attempts by some Southern states to
expose the names of those involved in the civil rights movement,
subject ing people to community sanctions.  In NAACP v.
Alabama,133 the Court held that the NAACP could not be compelled
to disclose the names and addresses of its members. According to
the Court, there is a “vital relationship between freedom to associ-
ate and privacy in one’s associations.”134 This was because revela-
tion of membership in the NAACP exposed members “to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.”135 
The First Amendment right to freedom of association, as well as
the Fifth Amendment, did not afford similar protections to the ex-
tensive investigation of Communists in the 1950s.136 The hunt for
Communists was led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, and aided
with substantial help from Hoover.137 The House Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC)138 forced individuals to testify public-
ly about their Communist Party ties and to disclose names of others
involved with the Party. The public disclosure of people’s ties to the
Communist Party often resulted in ostracism and blacklisting.139
Many journalists, professors and entertainers were fired and black-
listed from future employment.140 
133. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
134. Id. at 462.
135. Id. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down a law
requiring public teachers to list all organizations to which they belong or
contribute); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that a
state may not ask questions solely to gain information about a person’s
political views or associations).
136. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS 92–94 (1994).
137. GENTRY, supra note 127, at 378–80.
138. See SCHRECKER, supra note 136, at 76–84. For more background, see gen-
erally ALBERT FRIED, MCCARTHYISM: THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1997); and RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE
IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE (1990).
139. See Seth I. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 13–71 (1991).
140. SCHRECKER, supra note 136, at 76–84.
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In Barenblatt v. United States,141 a person refused to answer the
HUAC’s questions and was jailed for contempt. The Court held
that the First Amendment was not violated by the questioning. In
Wilkinson v. United States,142 a witness who criticized the HUAC
was interrogated about Communist ties. The Court upheld the
questioning because there was a “reasonable ground to suppose that
the petitioner was an active Communist Party member.”143 Justice
Black dissented, arguing that “this case involves nothing more nor
less than an attempt by the Un-American Activities Committee to
use the contempt power of the House of Representatives as a weap-
on against those who dare to criticize it.”144 
Ultimately, McCarthy experienced a downfall, the HUAC was
disbanded, and many today view the Communist hysteria as a pro-
found overreaction.
§ 1:4.2 The 1960s and 1970s
[A] New Limits on Government Surveillance
[A][1] Fourth Amendment Resurgence: Katz v. 
United States 
The Fourth Amendment underwent a revolution in the 1960s.
In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,145 the Court held that in all criminal pro-
ceedings, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is excluded from evidence in criminal trials.146 And in 1967, the
Court in Katz v. United States147 overruled Olmstead. Katz involved
the wiretapping of a telephone conversation made by the defendant
while in a phone booth. The Court declared: “What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”148 From Katz, the Court’s current ap-
proach to determining the Fourth Amendment’s applicability
emerged—the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The test, artic-
ulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence, asks whether (1) a person
exhibits an “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and (2) “the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reason-
able.’”149 
141. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
142. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
143. Id. at 414.
144. Id. at 417.
145. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
146. Id. at 655.
147. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
148. Id. at 351–52.
149. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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[A][2] Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control 
Act of 1968
One year after Katz, in 1968, Congress vastly expanded its statu-
tory protections against electronic surveillance beyond the limited
protection of section 605. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act150 extended the reach of wiretap regulations to
state officials as well as to private parties.151 Despite its profound
increase in the extent of protection, Title III had important limita-
tions. It applied to the interception of “aural” communications; it
did not apply to visual surveillance or other forms of electronic
communication.
[B] The Constitutional Right to Privacy
[B][1] Decisional Privacy: Griswold v. Connecticut
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Court held in a series of cases that
the Constitution protected a “zone of privacy” that safeguarded in-
dividual autonomy in making certain decisions involving their bod-
ies and families. In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,152 the Court
held that the government could not ban contraceptives. Although
the Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy, the
Court reasoned that such a right is found in the “penumbras” of
many of the ten amendments of the Bill of Rights.153 Following
Griswold, the Court held in Roe v. Wade154 that the right to privacy
“encompass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”155 
[B][2] Information Privacy: Whalen v. Roe 
Four years after Roe v. Wade, in 1977, the Court held in Whalen
v. Roe156 that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” ex-
tends to two distinct types of interests: (1) “independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions”; and (2) the “individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”157 The former
interest describes Griswold and Roe; the latter interest was one that
the Court had not yet defined. This latter interest has been called
150. Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–22.
151. See REGAN, supra note 114, at 122–25.
152. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
153. Id. at 484.
154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. Id. at 153.
156. Whalen v. Roe, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
157. Id. at 599–600.
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the “constitutional right to information privacy.” The Court also ar-
ticulated this interest in Nixon v. Administrator of General Servic-
es,158 decided that same year.
Following Whalen and Nixon, the Court did not develop the right
of information privacy. Nevertheless, a majority of circuit courts
have recognized this right, which has been involved in a substantial
number of cases.159 
[C] Responses to the Rise of the Computer
[C][1] Burgeoning Interest in Privacy
The development of the computer in 1946 revolutionized infor-
mation collection. Throughout the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the computer revolutionized the way records and data were
collected, disseminated, and used. The increasing use of computers
in the 1960s raised a considerable public concern about privacy.160
Commentators devoted significant attention to the issue.161 Privacy
also became an important topic on Congress’s agenda.162 
[C][2] Freedom of Information Act of 1966
The growing number of government agencies and the expanding
regulatory scope of the administrative state led to a strong senti-
ment that government records should be open to the public. In
1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), dra-
matically reforming public access to government records. Under
FOIA, “any person” may request “records” maintained by an execu-
tive agency.163 People or entities requesting records need not state a
reason for requesting records.164 Today, all fifty states have freedom
of information laws, many of which are based upon the FOIA.
158. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
159. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 401.
160. REGAN, supra note 114, at 82.
161. See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); MYRON BRENTON,
THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
(1967); ARTHUR MILLER, THE ATTACK ON PRIVACY (1971); NOMOS XII:
PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds. 1971); ALAN WESTIN &
MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-
KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Con-
trols Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966); Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and
Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211–45 (1968); Symposium, Privacy,
31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251–435 (1966).
162. See REGAN, supra note 114, at 82.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
164. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989).
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Among nine exceptions to disclosure, the federal FOIA contains
two exceptions that safeguard privacy. Exception 6 exempts “per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy.”165 Exemption (7)(C) exempts “records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes . . . which could reasonably be expect-
ed to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”166
When possible, records with redacted private data are disclosed to
requesters.167 
[C][3] Fair Information Practices
The increasing computerization of information and the burgeon-
ing repositories of personal data in federal agencies continued to be
a topic of importance. In 1973, the United States Department of
Health Education and Welfare (HEW) issued a report, “Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens,” which analyzed these prob-
lems in depth. The report observed:
[A]n individual must increasingly give information about him-
self to large and relatively faceless institutions, for handling and
use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too frequently,
unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not even know
that an organization maintains a record about him. Often he
may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control its dis-
semination, or challenge its use by others.168 
The report recommended the passage of a code of Fair Informa-
tion Practices:
• There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is
used.
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent infor-
mation about him obtained for one purpose from being
used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
167. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
168. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers,
and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Comm. on
Automated Personal Data Systems 29 (1973).
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• There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dis-
seminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use
and must take reasonable precautions to prevent mis-
use of the data.169 
As Marc Rotenberg observes, the Fair Information Practices
“played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United
States,”170 and influenced privacy law around the world.
[C][4] Privacy Act of 1974
A year after the HEW report, Congress passed the Privacy Act of
1974.171 The Act responded to many of the concerns raised by
HEW. It regulates the collection and use of records by federal agen-
cies, and affords individuals right to access and correct their person-
al information.172 Although the Act made important strides in
bringing government information systems under control, the Act
has a number of shortcomings. The Privacy Act does not apply to
the private sector. Nor does it apply to state or local agencies.
Another limitation in the Privacy Act is the “routine use” excep-
tion where information may be disclosed for any “routine use” if
disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose for which the agency
collected the information.173 Numerous commentators have criti-
cized the “routine use” exception as an enormous loophole.174 
The Privacy Act also attempted to restrict the use of SSNs. The
HEW report had noted that there was “an increasing tendency” for
the SSN to be used as a “standard universal identifier.”175 The Pri-
vacy Act aimed to “curtail the expanding use of social security num-
bers by federal and local agencies and, by so doing, to eliminate the
threat to individual privacy and confidentiality of information posed
by common numerical identifiers.”176 
169. Id. at 41–42.
170. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of
Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44.
171. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (2000) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
174. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Informa-
tion and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV.
553, 585–86 (1995); ROBERT GELLMAN, Does Privacy Law Work?, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 198 (Philip E. Agre &
Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997).
175. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report of the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems: Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, at xxxii (1973).
176. Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982).
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Unfortunately, the Act did not restrict the use of SSNs by the pri-
vate sector. As a result, the use of SSNs continued its upward
trend.177 Today, SSNs are used as a form of password to access one’s
accounts and records at banks, investment firms, schools, and hos-
pitals.178 
[C][5] Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
of 1974
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA),179 otherwise known as the “Buckley Amendment,” regu-
lates the accessibility of student records. FERPA does not apply to
records maintained by school law enforcement officials180 or health
and psychological records.181 
[C][6] Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978,182 cre-
ated a distinct regime for electronic surveillance to gather foreign
intelligence. Whereas Title III regulated electronic surveillance for
domestic law enforcement purposes, FISA applied when foreign in-
telligence gathering was “the purpose” of the investigation.183 FISA
permits electronic surveillance and covert searches pursuant to
court orders, which are reviewed ex parte by a special court of seven
federal judges. Information obtained through FISA orders can be
used in criminal trials.184 The protections against surveillance are
much looser than those of Title III. Under Title III and the Fourth
Amendment, surveillance is only authorized if there is a showing of
probable cause that the surveillance will uncover evidence of crimi-
nal activity. Under FISA, orders are granted if there is probable
cause to believe that the monitored party is a “foreign power” or “an
agent of a foreign power.”185 
177. See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman,
Subcomm. on Social Security, Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Rep-
resentatives: Social Security: Government and Commercial Use of the
Social Security Number Is Widespread (Feb. 1999).
178. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity
Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89, 108–14 (2001).
179. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).
180. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii).
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv).
182. Pub. L. No. 95-511, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11.
183. See former 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) prior to USA PATRIOT Act amend-
ment in 2001.
184. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 294.
185. 50 U.S.C. § 1801.
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[D] Financial Privacy
Several important legal developments regarding financial privacy
occurred throughout the 1970s. Many of these developments in-
volved the lessening of financial privacy.
[D][1] Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
In earlier times, in small towns, people could readily learn about
each others’ financial condition and trustworthiness. Creditors had
first-hand information about other people or could learn about
them through community gossip. In the twentieth century, with the
bulging population and increasing mobility of people, creditors no
longer had these easy methods to obtain data about people.186 Cred-
itors began to rely on records and documents to assess reputa-
tion.187 These developments spawned credit reporting agencies,
companies that obtain and report information about a person’s
credit history. Credit reports contain a detailed financial history, fi-
nancial account information, outstanding debts, bankruptcy filings,
judgments, liens, and mortgage foreclosures. Today, the three major
credit reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union) have
compiled extensive data about virtually every adult citizen.
Due to a series of complaints about erroneous credit reports and
non-responsiveness by credit reporting agencies,188 Congress passed
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in 1970.189 The FCRA pro-
vides limited protections for individuals. It enables people to access
their records, and restricts the manner in which records are dis-
closed. Individuals can challenge inaccuracies on their reports190
and can sue to collect damages for violations of the Act.191 
However, FCRA immunizes creditors and credit reporting agen-
cies from lawsuits for “defamation, invasion of privacy, or negli-
gence” except when the information is “furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure such consumer.”192 Although the FCRA al-
lows people to sue for negligent violations of the Act,193 there is a
two-year statute of limitations “from the date on which the liability
arises.”194 In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,195 the Supreme Court held this
186. STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTA-
TION IN AMERICA 3, 73 (1993).
187. SMITH, supra note 113, at 314.
188. See id. at 23.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
195. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
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period begins to run when the violations occurred, not when the in-
dividual discovers them. Many inaccuracies in credit reports, how-
ever, are not discovered for a significant period of time.
[D][2] Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
The Bank Secrecy Act, enacted in 1970,196 requires banks to re-
tain records and create reports to help law enforcement investiga-
tions. The Act was passed due to concerns that the computerization
of records would make white collar crime more difficult to detect.197
Federally insured banks must record the identities of account hold-
ers and maintain copies of each financial instrument. International
transactions exceeding $5,000 are subject to reporting,198 as well as
domestic transactions exceeding $10,000.199
In California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz,200 the Supreme Court up-
held the Act against a Fourth Amendment challenge by a group of
bankers and account holders. The Court concluded that the bankers
lacked Fourth Amendment rights in the data because “corporations
can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right
to privacy.”201 The account holders failed to allege that they engaged
in transactions exceeding $10,000, and as a result, lacked stand-
ing.202 
[D][3] United States v. Miller 
In 1976, in United States v. Miller,203 the Court held that finan-
cial records possessed by third parties are not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection.204 Federal agents issued subpoenas to
banks for the financial records of the defendant. The defendant ar-
gued that the government needed a warrant in order to obtain the
information. The Court concluded that the defendant lacked a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the records because “the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authori-
ties.”205 As the Court reasoned:
196. Pub. L. No. 91-508.
197. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 24 (1994).
198. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.23, 103.25.
199. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22.
200. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
201. Id. at 65.
202. Id. at 67–68.
203. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
204. Id. at 442–43.
205. Id. at 443.
WHOLEBOOK.book  Page 29  Monday, October 16, 2006  3:50 PM
1–30
§ 1:4.2 PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.206 
[D][4] Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
In 1978, two years after Miller, Congress passed the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),207 which provided limited protection
of financial records to fill the gap left by Miller. Pursuant to the
RFPA, government officials must use a warrant or subpoena to ob-
tain financial information.208 There must be “reason to believe that
the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry.”209 Subject to certain exceptions, the customer must receive
prior notice of the subpoena.210 
[E] The Retreat from Boyd
The 1886 case, Boyd v. United States, established that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments prevented the government from issu-
ing a subpoena to obtain a person’s private papers.211 Later on, in
Gouled v. United States,212 the Court concluded that the police
could not search one’s “house or office or papers” to obtain evidence
to use against that person in a criminal proceeding.213 These two
cases established what became known as the “mere evidence rule,”
which barred the seizure of papers unless they were instrumentali-
ties of a crime or illegal contraband. Although the mere evidence
rule was chipped away in subsequent decisions, it was officially
eliminated in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden.214 In Couch v. United
States,215 the Court concluded that personal records maintained by
third parties were not protected by the Fifth Amendment. The
206. Id. at 442.
207. Pub. L. No. 95-630.
208. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22. For more information on the RFPA, see George
B. Trubow & Dennis L. Hudson, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978: New Protection from Federal Intrusion, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. &
PROC. 487 (1979).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 3407.
210. Id. § 3409.
211. See supra section 1:3.2.
212. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
213. Id. at 309.
214. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
215. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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Court noted that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal priv-
ilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may
incriminate him.”216 Since the subpoena was issued on a third par-
ty, “[i]nquisitorial pressure or coercion against a potentially accused
person, compelling her, against her will, to utter self condemning
words or produce incriminating documents is absent.”217 Similarly,
in Fisher v. United States,218 the Court concluded that the Fifth
Amendment privilege did not apply to subpoenas for documents
maintained by a person’s attorney.219 The Fifth Amendment, con-
cluded the court, was limited to protecting against only the “com-
pulsion to testify against oneself.”220 
[F] The Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court issued several decisions
constraining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. In 1979,
the Court concluded in Smith v. Maryland221 that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to a list of the telephone numbers a per-
son dials that were recorded by a pen register.222 Since people “know
that they must convey numerical information to the phone compa-
ny” and that the phone company records this information for billing
purposes, people cannot “harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret.”223 Just three years earlier, the
Court in Miller had employed a similar rationale with regard to
bank records.224 
In 1978, the Court held in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,225 that the
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit state authorities from search-
ing the premises of third parties if the authorities had probable
cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be located at the
property.226 Zurcher involved a search of the offices of a newspaper
that had taken photographs of a violent demonstration. The news-
paper had no involvement in the demonstration and nobody at the
newspaper was suspected of criminal activity. The newspaper ar-
gued that searches of their offices “will seriously threaten the ability
of the press to gather, analyze, and disseminate news.”227 The
216. Id. at 328.
217. Id. at 329.
218. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
219. See id. at 414.
220. Id.
221. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
222. Id. at 743.
223. Id.
224. See supra section 1:4.2[D][3].
225. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
226. Id. at 554.
227. Id. at 563.
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Court, however, concluded that the requirements of a warrant
“should afford sufficient protection” against these harms.228 
§ 1:4.3 The 1980s
[A] Receding Fourth Amendment Protection
Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a series of de-
cisions adopting a narrow view of what constitutes a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. For example, in Florida v. Riley,229 the Court
concluded that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
greenhouse when the police flew over it with a helicopter.230 In Cali-
fornia v. Greenwood,231 the Court held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in garbage left in bags on the curb because
“[i]t is common knowledge that plastic bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scaven-
gers, snoops, and other members of the public.”232 The Court also
reasoned that the trash was left at the curb “for the express purpose
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might him-
self have sorted through [the] trash or permitted others, such as the
police, to do so.”233 
In the schools and the workplace, the Court concluded that peo-
ple only have limited expectations of privacy and that searches by
school officials and government employers are not subject to regular
Fourth Amendment requirements. In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,234 the
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment “is unsuited to the school’s environment” and that probable
cause “is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search.”235 Like-
wise, at the workplace, the Court held in O’Connor v. Ortega,236
that searches by government employers do not require a warrant or
probable cause; they only need to be “reasonable . . . under all cir-
cumstances.”237 
228. Id. at 565.
229. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
230. See id. at 451–52.
231. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
232. Id. at 40.
233. Id.
234. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1984).
235. Id. at 340.
236. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
237. Id. at 725–26.
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[B] The Growth of Federal Privacy Statutory 
Protection
[B][1] Privacy Protection Act of 1980
Dissatisfaction over Zurcher led Congress to pass the Privacy
Protection Act in 1980.238 The Act restricts the search or seizure of
“any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably be-
lieved to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.”239
As a result of the Act, a subpoena is needed to obtain work product
materials, which permits the party to challenge the request in court
and to produce the documents without having law enforcement offi-
cials intrude on the premises.
[B][2] Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984240 pro-
tects the privacy of cable records. Cable companies must notify sub-
scribers about the collection and use of personal information.241
Companies cannot disclose a subscriber ’s viewing habits.242 The
Act is enforced with a private right of action.
[B][3] Computer Matching and Privacy Protection 
Act of 1988
As discussed earlier, a major loophole in the Privacy Act of 1974
has been the “routine use” exception.243 Under this exception, to
detect fraud, the federal government in 1977 began running com-
puter comparisons of employee records with the records of people
receiving benefits.244 In 1988, Congress addressed this practice,
known as “computer matching” by passing the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act.245 The law established procedures for
computer matchings, but did not halt the practice.246 
238. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 551.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(C)(ii).
243. See supra section 1:4.2[C][4].
244. See REGAN, supra note 114, at 86; GELLMAN, supra note 174, at 198–99.
245. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(8)–(13), (e)(12), (o)–(r), (u)).
246. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Computer Matching: Quality of Deci-
sions and Supporting Analyses Little Affected by 1988 Act 3 (1993); PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 101 (1996).
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[B][4] Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988
In 1988, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
(EPPA).247 The EPPA prohibits private sector employers from using
polygraph examinations on employees and prospective employees.
The Act does not apply to public sector employers.248 Employers
can, however, use polygraphs “in connection with an ongoing inves-
tigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer ’s busi-
ness, such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of
unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage” when “the employer has
a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the inci-
dent or activity under investigation.”249 Private sector employers
who provide security services are exempt.250 
[B][5] Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
The confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice nominee
Robert Bork sparked a law to protect videocassette rental data. Re-
porters attempted to obtain a list of the videos Bork had rented from
his video store. Incensed at this practice, Congress passed the Video
Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988.251 The VPPA forbids video-
tape service providers from disclosing customer video rental or pur-
chase information.252 
[C] Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986
In 1986, Congress revisited its wiretapping law by substantially
reworking Title III of 1968. The Electronic Communications Priva-
cy Act (ECPA)253 expanded Title III to new forms of communica-
tions, with a particular focus on computers. The ECPA restricts the
interception of transmitted communications254 and the searching of
stored communications.255 Title I of the ECPA, known as the “Wire-
tap Act,” regulates the interception of communications.256 Title II,
referred to as the “Stored Communications Act,” governs access to
247. Pub. L. No. 100-618, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2001–09.
248. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a).
249. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d).
250. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e).
251. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195, (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–11).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b).
253. 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–22, 2701–11, 3121–27.
254. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
255. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11.
256. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
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stored communications and records held by communications ser-
vice providers (such as ISPs).257 Title III, called the “Pen Register
Act,” provides limited regulation of pen registers and trap and trace
devices.258 
[D] OECD Guidelines and International Privacy
Internationally, there was substantial growth in information pri-
vacy law. The most significant development was the creation of
guidelines for the protection of information privacy by the Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in
1980.259 The OECD Privacy Guidelines built upon the Fair Infor-
mation Practices articulated by HEW in 1973. The OECD Guide-
lines contain eight principles: 
(1) collection limitation—data should be collected lawfully with
the individual’s consent;
(2) data quality—data should be relevant to a particular purpose
and be accurate;
(3) purpose specification—the purpose for data collection
should be stated at the time of the data collection and the
use of the data should be limited to this purpose;
(4) use limitation—data should not be disclosed for different
purposes without the consent of the individual;
(5) security safeguards—data should be protected by reasonable
safeguards;
(6) openness principle—individuals should be informed about
the practices and polices of those handling their personal
information;
(7) individual participation—people should be able to learn
about the data that an entity possesses about them and to
rectify errors or problems in that data;
(8) accountability—the entities that control personal informa-
tion should be held accountable for carrying out these prin-
ciples.
257. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11.
258. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27.
259. GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS
OF PERSONAL DATA, available in MARC ROTENBERG, PRIVACY LAW SOUR-
CEBOOK (2002). For a comparison of U.S. privacy law to the OECD guide-
lines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY J. L. & TECH. 771 (1999).
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§ 1:4.4 The 1990s
[A] The Internet, Computer Databases, and 
Privacy
The last decade of the twentieth century presented profound new
challenges for the protection of information privacy, such as rise of
the Internet and the increasing use of email in the mid 1990s. The
Internet presented new methods of gathering information. When a
person visits a website, the website can record information about
the person and how the person navigates the website. This informa-
tion is referred to as “clickstream data.” To identify users, compa-
nies use an identifying tag known as a “cookie,” a text file that is
stored on the user ’s computer. When the user returns to the web-
site, the site searches for its cookie, which identifies the user and al-
lows the website to access the data it collected about the user from
her previous web surfing activity. Another information collection
device, known as a “web bug,” secretly uses pixel tags to gather data
about the user.260 
Throughout the 1990s, the collection and use of personal infor-
mation in computer databases rapidly accelerated. The decade saw
the rise of an entire industry devoted to aggregating personal infor-
mation for use by marketers—the database industry. Hundreds of
companies gather personal data and create massive databases,
which they then rent to marketers. The industry generates billions
of dollars each year.261 
[B] The Continued Growth of Federal Statutory 
Protection
As in the 1980s, Congress continued to pass a number of major
statutes to address emerging privacy problems.
[B][1] Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991
In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (TCPA),262 which permits people to request that telemarketers
not call them again. If the telemarketer continues to call, people can
sue for damages of up to five hundred dollars for each call.263 
260. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fearing a Plague of ‘Web Bugs’; Invisible Fact-
Gathering Code Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at
E1; Leslie Walker, Bugs That Go Through Computer Screens, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2001, at E1.
261. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Meta-
phors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407–09 (2001).
262. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
263. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).
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[B][2] Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994
For many years, states had been selling their motor vehicle
records to marketers.264 The sale of this information generated mil-
lions of dollars to states, and individuals had no way to block the
dissemination of their personal data.265 In 1994, Congress passed
the Driver ’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),266 which requires that
states first obtain a person’s consent before disclosing her motor ve-
hicle record information to marketers.267 The law was challenged on
federalism grounds, but in Reno v. Condon,268 the Supreme Court
held that DPPA fell within Congress’s authority to regulate inter-
state commerce:
The motor vehicle information which the States have histori-
cally sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers,
and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers
with customized solicitations. The information is also used in
the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private
entities for matters related to interstate motoring.269 
This decision has important implications for many federal priva-
cy statutes. Even in the face of the Court’s trend to limit Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause, the Court recognized that the
dissemination of personal information is an issue of interstate com-
merce.
[B][3] Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 is the first federal statute to directly address health
privacy.270 HIPPA required the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to draft regulations to protect the privacy of medical
records.271 HHS’s regulations, among other things, require that peo-
ple authorize all uses and disclosures of their health information
that are not for treatment, payment, or health care operation (such
as for marketing purposes).272 
264. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Governments Find Information Pays, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at A1.
265. See id.
266. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–25.
267. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12).
268. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 144–45 (2000).
269. Id. at 148.
270. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
271. 110 Stat. at 2033–34.
272. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a).
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HIPAA does have some important limitations. First, not all med-
ical records are covered—only records maintained by certain types
of record-holders: health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
health care providers.273 Although physicians, hospitals, pharma-
cists, and health insurers are covered, other parties that have medi-
cal information are not.274 For example, many websites gather
health information when conducting medical assessments, but
these websites are not covered by HIPAA.275 
Second, the regulations contain a broad provision for law en-
forcement access. They permit law enforcement officials to obtain
medical records with only a subpoena rather than a warrant.276 Ad-
ditionally, law enforcement officials can obtain health data if they
request it “for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugi-
tive, material witness, or missing person.”277 
[B][4] Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of
1998278 governs the collection of children’s personal information on
the Internet.279 The law only applies to children under the age of
thirteen.280 Children’s websites must post privacy policies and
obtain “parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of per-
sonal information from children.”281 COPPA applies only to web-
sites “directed to children” or where the operator of the website “has
actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a
child.”282 
273. Id. § 160.102.
274. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, EXPOSED ONLINE: WHY
THE NEW FEDERAL HEALTH PRIVACY REGULATION DOESN’T OFFER MUCH
PROTECTION TO INTERNET USERS 6–8 (Nov. 2001).
275. See id. at 7.
276. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii).
277. Id. § 164.512(f)(2).
278. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06.
279. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1).
280. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1).
281. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
282. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
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[B][5] The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act,283
which allows financial institutions with different branches or affili-
ates engaging in different services to share the “nonpublic personal
information” among each branch of the company. Affiliates must
inform customers of the information sharing, but people have no
right to stop the companies from sharing it. However, when finan-
cial institutions desire to share customer data with third parties,
people have a right to opt-out.284 
The GLB Act resulted in a mass mailing of privacy policies to
customers, informing them that data might be shared with other
companies and giving people a number to call or a form to fill out if
they wanted to block this data sharing. The opt-out provisions of
the Act were strongly criticized. For example, as Ted Janger and Paul
Schwartz noted, very few customers have opted-out.285 The reasons,
they stated, are that privacy policies are hard to understand and are
sometimes misleading; and opt-out rights are difficult and cumber-
some to exercise.286 
[C] The FTC and Privacy Policies
Since 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been
bringing actions against companies that violate their own privacy
policies. The FTC has interpreted the FTC Act, which prohibits
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”287
to be infringed when a company breaks a promise it made in its pri-
vacy policy. The FTC can bring civil actions and seek injunctive
remedies. Since it began enforcing the Act in this manner, the FTC
has brought several high-profile cases, almost all of which have re-
sulted in settlements.288 
[D] The EU Data Protection Directive
In 1996, the European Union promulgated the Data Protection
Directive,289 which establishes basic principles for privacy legisla-
tion for European Union member countries. As Joel Reidenberg ex-
plains:
283. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-–09).
284. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (b).
285. Ted Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Informa-
tion Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219,
1230 (2002).
286. See id. at 1230–41.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
288. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 750–59.
289. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31–50 (EC), hereinafter “EU
Data Protection Directive.”
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The background and underlying philosophy of the European
Union Directive differs in important ways from that of the
United States. . . . [T]he United States has, in recent years, left
the protection of privacy to markets rather than law. In contrast,
Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in fun-
damental human rights.290 
The EU Data Protection Directive provides for a comprehensive
protection of personal information maintained by a broad range of
entities. This omnibus approach exists in stark contrast to the
United States’ approach, which regulates privacy “sectorally” in var-
ious narrow contexts.291 
The EU Data Protection Directive also contains restrictions on
the flow of personal data outside the borders of EU nations to other
countries not governed by the Directive. Data can be transferred to
a third country if the country “ensures an adequate level of protec-
tion.”292 As Peter Swire and Robert Litan observed, the vastly differ-
ent approaches of the United States and EU presented significant
problems, since the United States may not be found to have an “ad-
equate level of protection” and this would have severe commercial
implications.293 In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce began
negotiating with the EU so that the United States would satisfy the
Directive’s requirement of having adequate protection. In 2000, an
agreement was reached, known as the Safe Harbor Arrangement.
Under the Arrangement, U.S. companies can voluntarily agree to
follow principles (drawn from the Fair Information Practices). Com-
pliance with the principles will be enforced by the FTC and Depart-
ment of Transportation.294 
290. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 717, 730 (2001).
291. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practices in
the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1995).
292. EU Data Protection Directive, Article 25(1).
293. See generally PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSI-
NESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998).
294. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 936–42.
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§ 1:5 The Twenty-First Century
§ 1:5.1 After September 11: Privacy in a World of 
Terror
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
the nation awakened to the reality that there were dangerous terror-
ist cells within U.S. borders. Shortly after September 11, there was a
strong political drive for new surveillance measures and new powers
for law enforcement officials. 
[A] The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
In a very short time after September 11, Congress passed the
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act” (USA
PATRIOT Act) of 2001. The Act made several significant changes
to the ECPA and FISA, among other statutes. In one amendment,
the USA PATRIOT Act enlarged the definition of pen registers and
trap and trace devices to apply to addressing information on emails
and to “IP addresses.”295 The Act also provided for new justifica-
tions for delayed notice of search warrants, increasing the types of
subscriber records that could be obtained from ISPs and communi-
cations providers, and allowing for a nationwide scope for pen regis-
ter orders and search warrants for email.296 The Act also provided
for roving wiretaps under FISA as well as increased sharing of for-
eign intelligence information between law enforcement entities.297 
Additionally, the Act expanded the application of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Previously, the looser protections
of FISA applied only when “the purpose” of the investigation was to
gather foreign intelligence. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded FISA’s
application to instances when foreign intelligence gathering is “a
significant purpose” of the investigation.298 
[B] The FISA “Wall”
Following 9/11, a contentious debate emerged about the FISA
“wall.” Since FISA allows law enforcement to use the information
gathered to prosecute crimes, there is a danger that FISA (a statute
designed for foreign intelligence gathering) will be used as an end-
around of the more stringent procedures in ECPA (a statute de-
signed to regulate electronic surveillance for domestic criminal
295. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act § 216.
296. See SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 294–300.
297. See id. at 343.
298. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) as amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 204.
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investigations). To protect against this, an “information screening
wall” is established to prevent law enforcement officials from initi-
ating or directing FISA surveillance. Relevant information is passed
on to law enforcement, but the law enforcement officials are walled
off from having control over the FISA surveillance.299 Unfortunate-
ly, during the investigation of the 9/11 terrorists prior to 9/11, FBI
officials were deeply confused about FISA and the “wall,” and this
stymied the investigation.300 
In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft submitted to the FISA
court new FISA investigation procedures that substantially dimin-
ished the “wall.” The FISA court rejected the procedures, noting
many errors in prior FISA applications and emphasizing the impor-
tance of the “wall.”301 The government appealed to the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court of Review, which in 2002, released its
first and only published opinion, In re Sealed Case.302 The court re-
versed the FISA court, and it concluded that the USA PATRIOT
Act, “by using the word ‘significant,’ eliminated any justification for
the FISA court to balance the relative weight the government places
on criminal prosecution as compared to other counterintelligence
responses.”303 
[C] The Homeland Security Act of 2002
In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act,304 which
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), consisting of
twenty-two federal agencies. The Act created a Privacy Office for en-
suring compliance with privacy laws.
[D] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act to facilitate greater information sharing between fed-
eral agencies. The Act requires that intelligence be “provided in its
most shareable form” and it aims to “promote a culture of informa-
tion sharing.”
299. For more information on the “wall,” see Peter Swire, The System of For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004);
Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L.
REV. 663 (2004); Jamie S. Gorelick, The Truth About “the Wall,” WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at B7.
300. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
301. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(May 17, 2002).
302. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.
Rev. 2002).
303. Id.
304. 6 U.S.C. § 222.
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[E] The Real ID Act of 2005
Attached to a military spending bill, and passed without debate,
the Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that state driver ’s licenses meet
federal standards set forth by the DHS.305 Critics claimed that it
would establish a de facto national identification card and that it
would be extremely costly for the states to implement.
[F] NSA Warrantless Surveillance
In December 2005, the New York Times reported that the Bush
Administration had secretly authorized the National Security Ad-
ministration (NSA) to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance
of American citizens.306 A debate has ensued about whether the
President violated FISA in conducting the surveillance and, if so,
whether the President has the constitutional power to conduct the
surveillance notwithstanding the limits set forth in FISA.
§ 1:5.2 Consumer Privacy
[A] The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act of 2003
In 2003, Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act (FACTA), which amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and extended its preemption on certain state law provisions ad-
dressing identity theft and credit reporting. Among other things, the
FACTA provided some limited protections against identity theft. For
example, FACTA requires credit reporting agencies to provide peo-
ple with a free credit report each year. It requires credit reporting
agencies to disclose to a consumer her credit score, and it allows
victims of fraud to alert just one credit reporting agency, which then
must notify the others. These provisions and others were criticized
by many as not going far enough to address the problem of identity
theft.
305. The “Real ID Act” was attached to the Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priation for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R.
1268, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005). The driver ’s license requirements are in
§ 202 of the Act.
306. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying
in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005.
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[B] The National Do-Not-Call Registry
In an effort to address unwanted telemarketing calls, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) created a do-not-call registry.307 People can voluntar-
ily register their telephone numbers, and commercial telemarketers
are prohibited from calling the numbers. Telemarketers challenged
the do-not-call registry as a violation of their First Amendment
rights. In 2004, a federal circuit court concluded in Mainstream
Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission308 that the
do-not-call registry satisfied the Central Hudson balancing test for
commercial speech and therefore did not run afoul of the First
Amendment.
[C] The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
In 2003, Congress enacted the Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM).309 The Act
restricts knowingly sending commercial messages to deceive or mis-
lead recipients. It requires spammers to contain a return address to
allow people to opt out and it creates civil and criminal penalties for
violations.
[D] Remsburg v. Docusearch 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a bold new theory
upon which companies could be liable for the way they disseminate
personal information. In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,310 a man
bought data about a woman from a database company. He used the
information about her work address to confront her at her place of
employment and kill her. The court held that the company could be
liable if it did not act with “reasonable care in disclosing a third per-
son’s personal information to a client.”311 
[E] Privacy Policies and Contract Law
After 9/11, federal agencies contacted several airlines and re-
quested that they turn over their passenger records, which con-
tained personal information about passengers including names,
flight numbers, credit card information, hotel information, and
meal requests. Several airlines complied, but their compliance was
307. The FTC rule is at 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), and the F.C.C. rule is at
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2).
308. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq.
310. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
311. Id.
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in breach of their privacy policies. In several cases, groups of plain-
tiffs sued the airlines for breach of contract. However, courts con-
cluded that general statements of policy were not contractual and
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish damages.312 
[F] Data Security Breaches
In February and March of 2005, several data brokers announced
major security breaches in the personal data that they stored.
ChoicePoint, one of the largest data brokers with files on nearly ev-
ery American citizen, sold personal data on over 145,000 people
(the figure was later revised to 162,000) to fraudulent companies es-
tablished by a ring of identity thieves.313 Other companies an-
nounced data leaks and break-ins, including LexisNexis.314 These
events gave renewed attention to the growing problem of identity
theft, a crime that affects about 10 million Americans each year.315 
The ChoicePoint breach came to light when ChoicePoint mailed
letters to 30,000 California residents informing them of what had
happened. This disclosure was done pursuant to California’s securi-
ty breach notice requirement, which provided:
Any person or business that conducts business in California,
and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes per-
sonal information, shall disclose any breach of the security of
the system following discovery or notification of the breach in
the security of the data to any resident of California whose
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed
to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclo-
sure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and
without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate
needs of law enforcement. . . .316 
312. See Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004); In re
Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. 2004); In re Jet-
blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
313. Joseph Menn, Did the ChoicePoint End Run Backfire?, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2005; Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gave Access to Fake Firms,
MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2005, at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969799/.
314. Ellen Simon, U.S. Citizens’ Data Possibly Compromised, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Mar. 9, 2005. For more background about consumer privacy and data bro-
kers, as well as legislative proposals to address the problem, see Daniel J.
Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection,
2006 ILL. L. REV. 357 (2006).
315. Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft Survey Report 4 (Sept. 2003).
For an excellent discussion of identity theft, see BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL
TWIN: BEHIND THE IDENTITY THEFT EPIDEMIC (2004).
316. S.B. 1386, codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a)).
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Soon thereafter, the attorney generals of other states began de-
manding that their residents be notified as well, and ChoicePoint
announced that it would voluntarily notify all who had been affect-
ed.
By early 2006, nearly half of the states had passed security
breach disclosure laws similar to California’s, and about a dozen
had passed security freeze laws that allow people to freeze access to
their credit reports.317 Bills are pending in many more states.
§ 1:6 Conclusion
Information privacy law has come a long way. Spurred by the de-
velopment of new technologies, the law has responded in numerous
ways to grapple with emerging privacy problems. Although the law
has made great strides, much work remains to be done. Several
scholars, including myself, have criticized the ability of information
privacy laws thus far to grapple with the growing collection and use
of personal information in computer databases.318 Recent books,
such as Robert O’Harrow’s No Place to Hide and my own book, The
Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, have
aimed to bring greater attention to the effects of companies main-
taining extensive dossiers of information about individuals and sell-
ing this data to government agencies for profiling and investigatory
purposes.319 As Paul Schwartz observes, “personal information in
the private sector is often unaccompanied by the presence of basic
legal protections. Yet, private enterprises now control more powerful
resources of information technology than ever before.”320 
317. For a compilation of these laws, see State PIRG Summary of State Security
Freeze and Security Breach Notification Laws, available at
www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm.
318. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001); Daniel
J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Consti-
tution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083 (2002); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and
the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Elbert Lin, Prioritiz-
ing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1085 (2002); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L.
REV. 393 (2002).
319. ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (2004).
320. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1633 (1999).
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